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REPARATIONS NOW!
A SUGGESTION TOWARD THE FRAMEWORK OF A
REPARATIONS DEMAND
AND A SET OF LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS
Imari A. Obadele, Ph.D.*
I. GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE CASE FOR REPARATIONS
THIS paper is a suggestion toward the elaboration of a via-
ble framework for the campaign for reparations, which are to be
paid to the descendants of persons held as slaves in North
America, by the United States government. It offers a set of le-
gal/political underpinnings which may prove useful as a point of
departure in making a compelling, logical case.
Annexed to this paper is a lean, proposed draft of legisla-
tion, which could be used as an initial framework for a bill in
Congress. Like the preferred legal/political case which follows,
the draft reparations legislation is a beginning, not the
conclusion.
Where one distinguished author on the case for reparations,
Professor Boris I. Bittker,1 would have us forsake claims for rep-
arations based on slavery and focus on claims arising since
Plessy v. Ferguson,2 this paper argues that reparations are due
us from both slavery and post-slavery activities of the United
States government. The focus of this paper, however, is on
claims arising from our enslavement.
This is not to say that post-slavery claims are unimportant.
They are quite important and a necessary part of our total pack-
age. In fact, during the past two decades a form of reparations
has been won by a scattering of legal claimants and union activ-
ists attacking post-slavery discrimination in the United States'
* President, The Provisional Government of the Republic of New Afrika. Visiting As-
sistant Professor of Political Science, College of Wooster, Ohio.
1. B. BITFKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 8-29 (1973).
2. 163 U.S.537(1896) (holding that separate-but-equal accommodations for black and
white railroad passengers did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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economic structure, although neither claimants nor repairers
have used the term reparation. Recall that the Weber' case
arose in the context of an affirmative action plan between the
United Steelworkers of America and the Kaiser Aluminum Com-
pany & Chemical Corp., which sought to have the number of
New Afrikans (i.e., "Black people") in the skilled trades at each
plant reach a number equivalent to the number of New Afrikans
in the local workforce. To achieve this, 50% of the places in in-
plant craft training classes were reserved for New Afrikans. In
the words of Justice Brennan, who wrote the opinion upholding
the plan, the purpose was "to eliminate conspicuous racial im-
balances in Kaiser's then almost exclusively white craftwork
forces.''14
In the first week of September, 1987, the state of Ohio de-
ferred settlement of one-half of a NAACP law suit which asked
back-pay and other provisions for New Afrikans who had been
discriminated against in employment opportunities with that
state's prisons.5 Ohio did, however, settle the half of the suit
which applied to women generally, agreeing to a payment of
$3.75 million for women who had been denied jobs, or assign-
ments at certain prisons. The settlement figure is largely for
back-pay and (for women not hired) missed pay.6 This settle-
ment gives promise of a later settlement based purely upon ra-
cial discrimination.
On May 12, 1987, Judge Barrington Parker of the United
States District Court for the District of Washington, D.C., ap-
proved a back-pay settlement in a ten-year-old racial discrimi-
nation, class action suit, which totaled $2.4 million dollars.
7 It
covered 350 present and former New Afrikan employees of the
United States Government Printing Office. Essentially the back-
pay award was to compensate for salaries which would have
been earned had there been no racial discrimination in promo-
tions and in assignment to journeyman positions. Earlier, in
1981, the judge had imposed goals and timetables for promo-
3. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
4. Id. at 198.
5. Sharkey, Women Win Suit, Back Pay As Guards, Clev. Plain Dealer, Sept. 3,
1987, at Al.
6. Id.
7. Lewis, Blacks at GPO Awarded $2.4 Million, Wash. Post, May 13, 1987, at A5.
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tions. These were met.'
A similar settlement was won by attorney Raymond Willis
and other lawyers more than a decade ago against Bell Tele-
phone of Michigan. There have been others since then.
Such settlements by private companies, as opposed to the
United States or state governments, bear a resemblance to the
private company settlements which have appeared in the scheme
of West German reparations for victims of the Nazi regime. A
year ago, for instance, Feldmuehle Nobel announced it would
pay the equivalent of $2 million to Jews who worked as slave
laborers in the industrial concern under the Nazi regime.'
I wish only to emphasize that post-slavery reparation
claims, even if arguably stopped with events occurring in 1968,
when the American state structure no longer contained racially
discriminatory laws, are an important area for our proper
attention. 10
I turn here to the question of slavery-based reparations
claims because of the enormity-duration and inhumanity-of
the acts committed against us during the era of slavery and the
failure of the United States governments, which gave the sanc-
tion and protection of the law to those acts and their perpetra-
tors, to make any sincere and comprehensive attempt at rehabil-
itation and compensation, in consultation with us.
We who make the claim of reparations due for slavery are
mindful of the disdain heaped upon our charges by people like
Professor Bittker. Bittker writes:
The preoccupation with slavery has stultified the discus-
sion of black reparations by implying that the only issue
is the correction of an ancient injustice, thus inviting the
reply that the wrongs were committed by persons long
since dead, whose profits may well have been dissipated
8. Id.
9. West German Company to Pay Jews It Used As Slave Labor, Wash. Post, Jan. 9,
1986, at A28.
10. See the "present value" work of Professor Richard F. America and other econo-
mists, who calculate reparations owed for the effects of slavery, poor health, lack of edu-
cation and other factors depriving New Afrikans of earnings. See generally Richard F.
America, Unjust Enrichment And Restitution: Defining And Measuring Current Bene-
fits From Past Wrongs, Estimation And Policy Implications, 5 N.Y.L.S. J. HUM. RTS. 413
(1988).
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during their own lifetimes or their descendants' and
whose moral responsibility should not be visited upon
succeeding generations, let alone upon wholly unrelated
persons.11
Bittker goes on to quote Robert Penn Warren asking whether
"an Athenian helot of the fifth century B.C.... [would] have a
claim today on the Greek government."'" Warren adds: "how
many explosion-prone trade guns, ankers of rum and iron bars
the Nigerian government owes what percentage of the twenty
million American Negroes" for their role in capturing and then
selling us?,, "The whole thing is a grisly farce. Come to think of
it, it smacks not of fantasy but of Bedlam.""'
Such poorly disguised hostility toward righting a monstrous
wrong against our people well suggests why in the past none of
our serious efforts for reparations, even when aided by well in-
tentioned Whites, has so far succeeded. This is so whether We
hark back to the question of forty acres and a mule inserted by
our friends in Congress into a Freedman's Bureau bill 5 and ve-
toed by Andrew Johnson (and not overridden by the Congress)
or to our many efforts since then. This opposition by "liberal"
Whites remains a practical obstacle of large magnitude.
While insisting that We should seek no redress for events
which occurred only 120 years ago, none of these gentlemen, in-
cluding Mr. Bittker, has seen fit to suggest that the inheritance
laws in the United States be changed so that everyone else who
is benefitting from a legacy accumulated 120 years ago foregoes
it. I found no indication in Mr. Bittker's book that he or his
associates, any of whom were benefitting from 120-year-old lega-
cies, had volunteered to give them up. I see no need to argue the
fact that labor was stolen from our people,'" but I will make fur-
ther comments sustaining the suggestion that reparations are
due not just for stolen labor but for unjust war and cultural ag-
11. B. BITTKER, supra note 1, at 9.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 10.
14. Id.
15. See W.E.B. DuBois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION 273-77 (1975); see generally G.
CABLE, THE FREEDMAN'S CASE IN EQUITY (1885).
16. But there are scholars who argue the amount of labor stolen and relate that to
conditions of poor White workers.
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gression. Whatever the amount owed, that amount constitutes a
legacy, never paid, and due to the heirs.
To help put the 120 years into better perspective, it is use-
ful to note that Justice Thurgood Marshall is described as the
great-grandson of a person held as a slave. 17 While Justice Mar-
shall is a few years older than I, I nevertheless remember my
grandfather well, and he was born just as slavery ended, assuring
that some of his relatives, perhaps even older siblings, had also
been held as slaves. It is relevant, moreover, that the heritage
which Mr. Bittker and other Whites enjoy in this country, even
the immigrants, is what has been called white skin privilege:
they benefit from a society, state, and economic structure which
are governed by White supremacy-except for the state struc-
ture which ceased to be so governed only a decade ago-and
while all of us may debate ingenious methods of operationalizing
this data for measurement, there is no question that Whites in
this country enjoy the fruits of 300 years of White supremacy.
As a nation, the Whites have been unjustly enriched by our sto-
len labor and succored by our degradation. White individuals
have partaken of all this.
The central proposition of this paper and the draft bill for
reparations, annexed, is that our enslavement in the Thirteen
Colonies and, later, in the United States, was a matter of
war-war conducted against Afrika under authority, initially, of
the British government and the legislatures of the Thirteen Col-
onies and ultimately under authority of the United States Con-
stitution. 8 It was war conducted against Afrikan people-who
grew into a nation, an oppressed nation, between 1660 and
1860-within the United States under British and Colonial au-
thority and, ultimately, of the authority of the United States
Constitution. 9
17. THE BURGER COURT 247 (V. Blasi ed. 1983).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 states:
[t]he Migration or Importation of Such Persons as any of the States now ex-
isting shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior
to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be
imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.
19. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 states:
[n]o Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof,
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein,
be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim
1988]
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The conditions of our degradation, a subordinated and ex-
ploited people denied liberty by force, are too well-known to be
re-documented or chronicled here. Justice Harlan, writing his
dissent in the Civil Rights Cases,20 said that the provisions of
the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act "placed at the disposal of the
master seeking to recover his fugitive slave, substantially the
whole power of the nation."'" The United States Army under
Andrew Jackson destroyed the New Afrikan states in Florida.22
Militia and White civilians carried war to all our communities in
the woods. The United States military and White civilians put
down the attempts of, first, Gabriel Prosser and then Denmark
Vesey and John Brown and Osborne Anderson to seize land and
build new Afrikan states.2 For these state-builders the United
States courts authorized bloody executions, corporal punish-
ment, and transportation beyond United States shores. More-
over, the courts and executive functionaries coldly carried out
the inhumane re-enslavement of inoffensive persons who had
simply slipped away quietly from enslavement, doing harm to no
one, seeking only a degree more freedom in the North.
It is the proposition of this paper, embracing propositions
enunciated by the Provisional Government of the Republic of
New Afrika24 sixteen years ago, that the United States con-
ducted war against the New Afrikan nation on this land
throughout the era of slavery, that the war was authorized by
the United States Constitution and carried out in aggressive mil-
itary actions against the efforts of our people to seek freedom
individually and to build New Afrikan states collectively, by the
of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.
20. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
21. Id. at 30.
22. See generally LITTLEFIELD, AFRICANS AND SEMINOLES: FROM REMOVAL To EMANCI-
PATION (1977).
23. For information on Gabriel Prosser, see 1 FONER, HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS:
FROM AFRICA TO THE EMERGENCE OF THE COTTON KINGDOM 453-56 (1975); for information
on Denmark Vesey, see Introduction by J.O. Killens, The Trial Record of Denmark Ve-
sey (1970) for information on John Brown and Osborne Anderson, see W.E.B. DuBos,
JOHN BROWN (1962) and 0. ANDERSON, A VOICE FROM HARPERS FERRY (Boston 1861).
24. See the PG-RNA's brochure, THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT REPUBLIC OF NEW
AFRIKA, A PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE (1986) (obtainable at Box 90604, Washington, D.C. 30090-
0604). Throughout this paper, the Provisional Government of the Republic of New
Afrika is referred to in any of the following abbreviated forms: Provisional Government;
RNA; RNA Provisional Government; PG-RNA; PG.
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United States government itself, by the various state govern-
ments and by civilians mobilized against the New Afrikan peo-
ple and nation.
It is the propostion of this paper that reparations must be
part of a general settlement of the war which the United States
had waged against us. In keeping with settlements consum-
mated, at the end of World War I and World War II, and with
the precedents of international law created by these settlements,
the settlement for New Afrikan people must include not simply
reparations but exercise of the free and informed right to self-
determination by our people and the release of our militants,
soldiers, prisoners of war now in jails who were taken in defense
of our nation against the United States.
In summary, the money damages due are, of course, for la-
bor stolen from our forebears, and for cultural assault, and for
unjust war, with accumulated interest. But the money portion of
our reparations must be a significant contribution toward reha-
bilitation: repatriation for those who wish and can achieve citi-
zenship in an Afrikan state, rehabilitation of the New Afrikan
states and incipient states, and their successors, destroyed on
this soil during the war which was slavery, and afterwards.
There must be payments for rehabilitation of us as a people in
recognition of the design followed in the United States to make
us into a race of ignorant subservients, unable to revolt, and for-
getful that We had a duty to do so. Lerone Bennett, writing in
his Confrontation: Black and White2 5 gives one compelling sum-
mary of some aspects of the cultural aggression for which repa-
rations are due. He writes:
Anticipating the devious tactics of the modern police
state, masters laid hands on the minds of their chattel.
By the old method of the carrot and the stick, by terror
and by smiles, by whips, chains, words, symbols, prayers,
and curses, the Negro was taught to "stand in fear" of
white power.
In some such manner, Africans were given a new
conception of themselves, a conception that carried as
core-elements guilt, anxiety, and inferiority. The laying
of hands on the mind of a whole people, the pulling out
25. L. BENNETT, CONFRONTATION: BLACK AND WHITE (1965).
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by the roots of old customs and habits, continued for
hundreds of years. Hundreds of thousands died in the
process, and hundreds of thousands went insane. But
millions survived, maimed to be sure, shrunken, shriven,
diminue but, withall, alive and breathing ......
There are certainly reparations due to certain Afrikan states
for the war which the United Stated authorized (and protected)
against them; to us, as well, for our states that were weakened or
destroyed in Afrika during the course of America's war there,
which resulted in our enslavement. (A state, with its army, pro-
tects the people. People cannot be harmed by outsiders unless
the army is destroyed, rendered ineffective, or co-opted.) And it
is also true that discussions must be held with Nigeria and other
states on reparations for us. These could involve not simply
trade arrangements but substantial political and diplomatic as-
sistance for those of us who want independent statehood.
Those discussions are separate, however, from the claims
against the United States-and the subject of this paper.
The precedents for the claims described above are to be
found in
(1) the agreements which concluded World War I and
World War II;27
(2) the United States Supreme Court case, United States v.
Libellants and Claimants of the Schooner Amistad;2 8
(3) the New International Law Regime, which took its rise
with the Declaration On The Granting of Independence to Co-
lonial Countries and Peoples;29 and,
(4) the principles involved in the work of the Indian Claims
Commission.3
With respect to the lapse of time beween the United States'
initial cease-fire against us (the Thirteenth Amendment of De-
cember 1865)1 and Queen Mother Moore's proffer of the Ethio-
26. Id. at 32.
27. See infra Section III.
28. 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 332 (1841).
29. G.A. Res. 1514, 1 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16) at 188, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961).
30. 25 U.S.C.A. § 70 - 70n-2 (omitted Sept. 30, 1978); § 70n-3 (repealed Jan. 2, 1975,
88 stat. 1970, Pub. L. 93-608 § 1(16)); § 70n-4 - 70v-3 (omitted Sept. 30, 1978); § 70w
(repealed May 24, 1949, c. 139, § 142, 62 stat. 109) (1946).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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pian Women's complaint against the United States and petition
for reparations to the United Nations in 1958,32 three comments
are particularly appropriate. First, Queen Mother Moore's ef-
forts were not a beginning; at no substantial period during the
era since slavery have our people neglected wholly the campaign
for reparations. Second, it has been the power of the United
States and its refusal to consider reparations for New Afrikans
which has frustrated our efforts heretofore, not any failure on
our part to pursue these demands.
This is relevant to the legal doctrine of laches. Based upon
the maxim that equity aids the vigilant and not those who slum-
ber on their rights, the doctrine of laches operates against one
who neglects to assert a claim when such neglect, considered
with the passage of time, harms the adverse party. Laches could,
of course, become applicable where it is the heir of the party
against whom the claim is asserted, rather than the actual of-
fending party. Justice Paul Stevens of the U.S. Supreme Court,
writing the dissent in County of Oneida, New York v. Oneida
Nations,33 arguing that a claim of the 1795 transaction should
have been barred by laches, put it this way: "The Court recog-
nized that the long passage of time, the change in the character
of the property, the transfer of some of the property to third
parties, the absence of any obvious inadequacy in the considera-
tion received in the original transaction, and Patrick's lack of
direct participation in the original transfer all supported a
charge of laches against the plaintiffs."34 (Of course, hardly any-
one would argue that there was any adequacy in the considera-
tion - i.e., pay and room and board - provided persons held in
America as slaves.)
In this case the Supreme Court majority was unconvinced
that laches could be applied and pointedly emphasized that
Congress should act in such matters. The Court added: "One
would have thought that claims dating back more than a century
and a half would have been barred long ago. As our opinion indi-
32. See A Witness to History, N.Y. Daily News, Feb. 3, 1985, at 3, col. 1. For more
information regarding Queen Mother Moore, see WORLD FEDERATION OF AFRICAN PEOPLE,
INC. INTERNATIONAL HEADQUARTERS, BIOGRAPHICAL RELEASE (undated) (available at Mt.
Addis Ababa, Box 244, Parksville, New York 12768).
33. 47 U.S. 226 (1985).
34. Id. at 264.
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cates, however, neither petitioners nor we have found any appli-
cable statute of limitations or other relevant legal basis for hold-
ing that the Oneidas' claims are barred or otherwise have been
satisfied.
35
Finally, it should be noted that under the Franco-German
peace treaty of May 10, 1871, the French lost an area known as
Alsace-Lorraine, and many French citizens, resident in Alsace-
Lorraine, lost French citizenship. 6 Fifty years later, under the
Versailles Treaty which ended World War I and went into force
on January 10, 1920, France not only received Alsace-Lorraine
once more but reinstated French citizenship. 7 Only the
Germans batted an eye.
II. WAS IT WAR AND Do WE HAVE SELF-DETERMINATION
RIGHTS?
Two essential questions should be addressed. First, was it
war? Second, do New Afrikans have self-determination rights?
Also implicated is the question as to whether New Afrikans in
the United States constitute a "nation." We turn now to the first
question.
In general, "war" has been held to be traditionally of two
types, conflicts between states, which are governed by interna-
tional law and practice, and civil wars, in which a part of a state
contends for sovereignty over territory claimed by the parent-
state. Lately, conflicts of liberation movements, including con-
flicts like that in South Afrika at the present time, where the
liberation forces are unable to place armies openly in the field or
to hold and govern territory openly, have gained status under
the international law. The 1977 Protocol to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949, states in Article One:
4. The situations referred to in the preceding para-
graph include armed conflicts in which peoples are fight-
ing against colonial domination and alien occupation and
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self-
determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United
35. Id. at 253.
36. Treaty of Peace Between France and Germany, May 10, 1871, 143 Parry's T.S.
163.
37. Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, 225 Parry's T.S. 189, 232-33.
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Nations and the Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-opera-
tion among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations."'
The record is replete with instances of armed conflict and
armed suppression of suspected militants by the United States,
during and after slavery.39 Moreover, the general conditions of
slavery make clear also that We were subject during the slavery
era to "colonial domination and alien occupation." When one
considers the persistent action of the United States and its po-
litical subdivisions against our communities in the woods and
against the Apalachicola and Seminole'states in Florida,4
against Tunis Campbell's state, set up on Sapelo and St. Cathe-
rine's Islands, off Georgia, after the Civil War,41 the words of
Justice Johnson, concurring in the decision against the Cherokee
in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,2 come readily to mind:
That in pursuance of those laws, the functionaries of
Georgia have entered their territory, with an armed force,
and put down all powers legislative, executive, and judi-
cial, exercised under the government of the Indians.
What does this series of allegations exhibit but a
state of war, and the fact of invasion? They allege them-
selves to be a sovereign, independent state, and set out
that another sovereign State has, by its laws, its function-
aries, and its armed force, invaded their state and put
38. See M. POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE 53 (1982) (citing
the 1977 Protocol to the Geneva Convention of 1949, Article One).
39. See, e.g., HERBERT APTHEKER, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVE REVOLTS (5th ed. 1983);
Imari Obadele, The First New Afrikan States, 16 THE BLACK COLLEGIAN 86 (Jan./Feb.
1986); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (eighteen white men, including three
law enforcement officials, were convicted in Mississippi for murdering three New
Afrikans); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (the conviction of five New Afrikans for
the murder of a white man following a series of violent incidents directed against New
Afrikans was unconstitutional under the due process clause); United States v. James, 528
F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1976) (the convictions of five citizens of the Republic of New Afrika
resulting from a raid by FBI Agents and Jackson City police on the RNA capitol were
affirmed).
40. See LITTLEFIELD, supra note 22.
41. See sources cited infra note 46.
42. 9 U.S. (5 Pet.) 178 (1831) (The Court denied injunctive relief for lack of jurisdic-
tion. The Cherokee Nation is not a foreign nation with respect to certain Constitutional
provisions.).
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down their authority. This is war in fact, though, not be-
ing declared with the usual solemnities, it may, perhaps,
be called war in disguise.3
Professor von Glahn notes that "a British report in 1870
showed that between 1700 and 1870, a total of 107 conflicts had
been initiated without the formality of a declaration of war.""
He goes on: "The United States, too, has conducted wars with-
out a declaration: an undeclared war with France from 1798 to
1801, the invasion of Florida in 1811 under Generals Jackson
and Matthews, the brief Mexican invasion in 1916, the un-
declared war with the Soviet Union in 1918-1919, and, of course,
the Vietnamese conflict from 1947 onward (for the United
States, from March 7, 1965, to March 29, 1973). (Footnote
omitted)""5
The effort of some New Afrikans to form an independent
state has been an almost continuous effort from the time of our
first flight and revolts in this land to the present. The state-
building of Tunis Campbell had hardly been put down when
Henry Adams and his associates in Louisiana and Mississippi
began their appeals to Congress for "land anywhere. '4 6 Edward
43. Id. at 191.
44. G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 627 (5th ed. 1986).
45. Id.
46. U.S. Senate Hearings, Vol. 8, No. 693, 1880. Tunis Campbell's state is mentioned
in DuBois, supra note 15. See also, EDWARD MAGDOL, A RIGHT TO THE LAND, ESSAYS ON
THE FREEDMAN'S COMMUNITY 104-106 (1977). Magdol also describes other self-governing
New Afrikan communities. The following paragraphs on Governor Campbell's state come
from the dissertation of Imari Obadele, OBADELE, NEW AFRIKAN STATE-BUILDING IN
NORTH AMERICA 345-57 (University of Michigan Microfilm 1985):
In 1864 General Saxton had appointed the Reverend Tunis G. Campbell, a New
Jersey born Methodist Episcopal minister who had arrived in Beaufort, South
Carolina, two years earlier, as organizer for St. Catherine, Sapelo, Ossabaw and
other islands. Campbell testified that Saxton had appointed him governor.
(Footnote omitted) In any event, Campbell, building his central community on
Sapelo and St. Catherine Islands, claimed jurisdiction over mainland territory to
a depth of thirty miles. With thirteen United States troops assigned to provide
the defense that Sherman's order specified, Governor Campbell organized his
government's own force of 275 men. The government included a House of Repre-
sentatives and a Senate, and among its laws was one, tracking Sherman's order,
which excluded all white people. (Footnote omitted)
DuBois, speaking of Johnson's pardons to ex-Confederates and the restoration of their
"titles" to land held by New Afrikans, particularly the sea islands, stated: "The land-
lords hurried to get their pardons and to take back their lands. The Negroes resisted
sometimes with physical force." DuBols, supra note 15, at 386.
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McCabe's efforts to make Oklahoma a black state47 (initially, at
least, within the United States federal union), preceded the
work of Marcus Garvey by more than a generation, but there is
linkage between Marcus Garvey and Elijah Muhammed and Al
Hajj Al Malik Shabazz, Malcolm X.48 Malcolm's work gave birth
to the Provisional Government, Republic of New Afrika, which
today and since 1968 has led the effort for the establishment of
an independent New Afrikan state in Mississippi and four other
Deep South states."9
If the level of United States military attacks against New
Afrikans and the New Afrikan nation receded in the period fol-
lowing the Civil War, our colony was nevertheless subject to a
racially conscious policy by sheriffs and local police. The army
would appear to suppress us during uprisings such as those in
1919, the 1940s, and the 1960s. The reason for the reduction in
naked military attacks lay mainly in our resort to parliamentary
means of struggle, after the Civil War. But there was no aban-
donment of the drive for independent New Afrikan state-
hood-nor for the other two objectives toward which some of
our people had striven traditionally: (1) the changing of the
United States from a racist polity and full citizenship in the
United States; and (2) return to Afrika.
It is relevant to the charge of war against the United States
that We were still an occupied and oppressed nation in this pe-
riod between the Civil War and 1968. We were a colony living on
territory claimed by the United States, subject until 1968 to a
body of legislation and court decisions which defined our subor-
dination to the White nation and facilitated the White nation's
economic and cultural exploitation of us, and our social
degradation.5"
47. See J. FRANKLIN, JOURNEY TOWARD HOPE: A HISTORY OF BLACKS IN OKLAHOMA 13-
15 (1982).
48. For information on Marcus Garvey, see E. CRONON, BLACK MOSES: THE STORY OF
MARCUS GARVEY AND THE NEGRO IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION (1955), and for information
on Elijah Muhammed and Malcolm X, see L. LOMAX, WHEN THE WORD IS GIVEN: A RE-
PORT ON ELIJAH MUHAMMED, MALCOM X, AND THE BLACK MUSLIM WORLD (1963), and
MALCOLM X with A. HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (1965).
49. The "five states" are Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Caro-
lina. See THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT REPUBLIC OF NEW AFRIKA, A PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE,
supra note 24.
50. See THE AGE OF SEGREGATION: RACE RELATIONS IN THE SOUTH, 1890-1945 (R.
Haws ed. 1978); Derrick Bell, The Racial Imperative in American Law, in THE AGE OF
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Even the Malcolmites, who after March 1968 led the strug-
gle for independent statehood and who were resolute practition-
ers of armed self-defense, eventually supported by the Black
Liberation Army, pursued a strategy of attempting to organize,
peacefully, an independence plebiscite.5 1 This parliamentary
strategy was in accordance with the precepts of the New Inter-
national Law Regime, ushered in by the United Nations' Decla-
ration On the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples,52 in 1960. When the organizing of the armed, self-
defending cadres of the Provisional Government accelerated in
Mississippi in 1971, however, the United States turned to its
military option. At dawn on Wednesday, August 18, 1971, a
force of FBI Agents and Jackson City police, accompanied by an
armored truck, attacked the official Provisional Government
Residence. After twenty minutes of heavy gunfire exchange,
the seven occupants of the house, along with the four who had
spent the night at the office several blocks away, were charged
with conspiracy, the murder of the police lieutenant who died in
that attack, and the assault of the FBI Agent and the policeman
who were wounded.54 In the fall of 1981 the United States
brought massive military force to bear in McComb County, Mis-
sissippi, to arrest Sister Fulani Sunni Ali, a longtime RNA of-
ficer, who was quietly conducting a summer camp for children in
the country. 5 The pretext was the New York Brinks incident,
during which Black Liberation Army members, and some of
their White supporters were implicated, some arrested and
jailed, and one murdered in cold blood by police as he lay help-
less on the ground. 6
SEGREGATION: RACE RELATIONS IN THE SOUTH, 1890-1945 (R. Haws ed. 1978); JOHN HOPE
FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM (5th ed. 1980); LERONE BENNETT, JR., BEFORE THE
MAYFLOWER (5th ed. 1982); and VINCENT HARDING, THERE Is A RIVER, THE BLACK STRUG-
GLE FOR FREEDOM IN AMERICA (1981).
51. The Black Liberation Army, an underground formation, grew out of the East
Coast Black Panthers in the early 1970s. The Army has been implicated in bank hold-
ups and Brinks armored truck robberies, and shooting battles with police.
52. G.A. Res. 1514, 1 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 188, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961).
53. United States v. James, 528 F.2d 999, 1007-8 (5th Cir. 1976). See also, IMARI
OBADELE, FREE THE LAND! (1984). Nine of the RNA-11 spent four to ten years in prison.
54. James, 528 F.2d at 1008-9.
55. See Maitland, Two New Brink's Suspects Held in Mississippi and Manhattan,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1981, at Al, col. 1 and B6.
56. See McFadden, Man Killed in Queens Car Chase; Plate Tied to Armored-Car
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If it is possible to argue that the form of the war against us
changed after the Civil War, from military activity to occupation
duties, the United States kept the military sanction always
ready-and, from time to time, used it.
The question was land. The United States government, un-
able to export us en masse after the Civil War, was not espe-
cially concerned that United States policies had fueled our
growth as a separate people-giving us our own perspective and
history and common gene pool, raising up, between 1660 and
1860, a vastly numbered New Afrikan nation on this soil. Our
status as a nation, despite our numbers, posed little more prob-
lem for the United States than the many Indian nations-so
long as We did not focus overly on our separateness and na-
tionhood, and so long as We did not seriously act for statehood,
for sovereignty over land. The international law was shaped by
Europeans and their conquests, with respect to sovereignty over
land, national title to land, and the law was clear. For instance,
the principle of prescription still means that a state may acquire
title over land, originally belonging to another state, by occupa-
tion over a long period of time." How long is a "long" time?
There seems to be no generally accepted international standard.
One United States court decision, dealing with awards to Indian
states, determined that title to land could be recognized for a
group which had occupied it without interruption for 50 years. 8
The United States' objective with respect to the RNA Provi-
sional Government (PG-RNA) was to prevent undisturbed occu-
pation for any period of time.
There is little doubt that the United States realized that a
form of the prescription principle is embedded in the New
Afrikan Creed, which today is part of the Republic's constitu-
tion, the Code of Umoja, and which is recited by gathered Provi-
sional Government cadre at meetings and all important occa-
sions. "I believe," runs the paragraph from the Creed, "that all
Gang, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1981, at Al, col. 3 and A8, col. 1; Maitland, Police Find a
History of Arrests, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1981, at A8, col. 1.
57. VON GLAHN, supra note 44, at 317.
58. United States v. Seminole Indians of Fla., 180 Ct. Cl. 375 (1967). Another of the
cases arising under the Indian Claims Commission indicates that the length of time of
occupancy should permit that people to transform land to domestic territory. Confeder-
ated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 184, 194 (1966).
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the land in America, upon which We have lived for a long time,
which We have worked and built upon, and which We have
fought to stay on, is land that belongs to us as a people." (That
claim is constitutionally subject to the just claims of the Indi-
ans.) There is little doubt that the United States understood
that the PG was acting upon this principle in Mississippi.
The particular problem for the United States was that the
Provisional Government had been created at a founding conven-
tion and then regularly elected, by popular vote since 1975. Al-
though the voting has always taken place in several cities, the
totals, so far, have always been small-the largest being the
5,000 cast in 1975. But the fact of the vote and the potential for
it becoming a widespread institution among New Afrikan peo-
ple, despite the perpetual press "white-out" of New Afrikan ac-
tivities, posed and pose a serious problem for United States pol-
icy-makers. To begin with, the United States is a party to the
1933 Convention on Rights and Duties of States,5 9 done at
Montevideo. This convention's definition of the "state" is in fact
the definition which has entered into the principles of United
States law, repeated in numerous contexts. '0 Article One of the
convention states:
The state as a person of international law should possess
the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population;
(b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) the ca-
pacity to enter into relations with the other states.6
1
The Provisional Government was (and is) a democratically
elected government; it was voted for in Mississippi, which testi-
fied to representation of a permanent population, and it had car-
ried on various nascent forms of relations with China and Cuba
(and, in the days since the Mississippi effort of the 1970s, is con-
tinuing to broaden these relations with other states). What was
lacking, then, to convert this state-building entity, the Provi-
sional Government, into a state was uninterruptLd possession of
land.
59. Rights and Duties of States (Inter-American), Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 3 Bev-
ans 145.
60. See, 1 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, DEP'T OF ST., PUB. No. 7403, 221
(1963).
61. Rights and Duties of States, supra note 59, 3 Bevans at 147.
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The United States' attack on the Provisional Government in
Mississippi and the subsequent major de-stabilization of the
Provisional Government by the jailing of some of its leaders and
a continuation of the FBI's disinformation campaign were sim-
ply consistent with the attacks in former days on Gabriel Pros-
ser, Denmark Vesey, John Brown and Osborne Perry Anderson,
the New Afrikan states in Florida, and the state of Tunis Camp-
bell. The rationale was simple and obvious: the United States,
which into this century was completing the process of driving
the Indians from seats of sovereignty from sea to shining sea,
from the Canadian border to Mexico and the Gulf, was not pre-
pared to abide the creation of an independent New Afrikan state
in North America. Thus, the attacks, the recurrent hot war.
But there was a difference in the international law regime
under which the military actions against the New Afrikan states
and state-builders before 1960 were carried out and the interna-
tional law regime under which United States military attacks
against the Provisional Government were carried out after 1960.
The Decolonization Declaration" said, simply that "All peoples
have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their ec-
onomic, social and cultural development."6 This language has
been carried over into the human rights conventions. It was a
victory of the Afro-Asian bloc in the General Assembly, achiev-
ing numerical prominence for the first time in 1960, and it
marked a revolution in the international law. The Declaration
states: "4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds
directed against independent peoples shall cease in order to en-
able them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to com-
plete independence . ... ,, The Declaration makes liberation
struggles lawful and, possibly, peaceful.
Theretofore, the international law that counted had been
written and accepted by the United States and European pow-
ers. It served the ratification of their conquests of the rest of the
world and codified practices which they had found to be mutu-
ally convenient. The Versailles Treaty of 1920,65 ending World
62. G.A. Res. 1514, 1 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 188, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961).
63. Id. at 189.
64. Id.
65. Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, 225 Parry's T.S. 189.
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War I, joins the Berlin Treaty of 1885,66 as a leading statement
of the international law as the White and powerful states of the
world saw it and enforced it. This document provided for our
degradation: it left the Afrikan and Asian colonies of the World
War I victors in place, and, instead of freeing those held by the
defeated Germany, gave our hapless countries and peoples to
the mandated "care" of Britain, France, and Belgium-at the
same time that this treaty was concretizing self-determination
as a right for Czechs and Poles and several other peoples in
Europe. 7
The Afro-Asians in 1960, with the assistance of Canada and
a few other states, rewrote the international law: from that
point, not only Europeans but all peoples had the right to self-
determination. A subsequent, relatively rapid development of
the law, followed. The principle of self-determination was incor-
porated in the Declaration on the Principles of International
Law in October, 1970.
68
The United States abstained from voting on the 1960 Decla-
ration, objecting to the word "independence" in the title, argu-
ing that independence was not the only possible result of an act
of self-determination by a people. But the United States Repre-
sentative, James J. Wadsworth, speaking to a plenary session of
the United Nations General Assembly on December 6, 1960,
made these extraordinary remarks, which, of course, under
United States constitutional principles are deemed to be the
words of the United States President and an authoritative state-
ment of international law as the United States views it:
First let me say what we mean by colonialism .... It
is the imposition of alien power over a people, usually by
force and without the free and formal consent of the gov-
erned. It is the perpetuation of that power. It is the de-
nial of the right of self-determination-whether by sup-
pressing free expression or by withholding necessary
educational, economic, and social development. Obvi-
ously not all colonial regimes have been the same ....
66. General Act of the African Conference, Feb. 26, 1885, 76 British and Foreign
State Papers 4.
67. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 65.
68. G.A. Res. 2625, GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 337, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
386 [Vol. V
REPARATIONS NOW
But, however important these differences, the fact re-
mains that colonialism in any form is undesirable.
Neither the most benevolent paternalism by a ruling
power nor the most grateful acceptance of these benefits
by indigenous leaders can meet the test of the charter or
satisfy the spirit of this age.69
The Declaration on the Principles of International Law in
its "principle of equal rights and the self-determination of peo-
ples," states, inter alia:
Every State has a duty to promote, through joint
and separate action, the realization of the principle of
equal rights and self-determination . . . bearing in mind
that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domina-
tion and exploitation constitutes a violation of the princi-
ple, as well as a denial of fundamental human rights, and
is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.
The establishment of a sovereign and independent
State, the free association or integration with an indepen-
dent State or the emergence into any other political sta-
tus freely determined by a people constitute modes of
implementing the right of self-determination by that
people."
Now, the United States' ratification of the concepts con-
tained in the two cited Declarations does not rest, alone, upon
Ambassador Wadsworth's extraordinary 1960 remarks. Mr. Rea-
gan's administration, in arguing in favor of the commonwealth
and free association arrangements which the United States was
implementing with the Marshall and Mariana Islands-part of
the "Strategic Trust" of the Pacific mandated to the United
States after World War II-explicitly embraced the self-deter-
mination formulation cited, above, in the Declaration on the
Principles of International Law.
7 1
69. DEP'T OF ST. BULL., U.S. DEP'T OF ST., PUB. No. 1123, UNITED STATES PRESENTS
VIEWS ON COLONIALISM 21,22 (1961).
70. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 68 at 339-40.
71. Specifying the paragraph, above, on "modes of implementing the right of self-
determination," Ambassador Harvey J. Feldman, on 21 May 1985, told the Trusteeship
Council: "To paraphrase a famous quotation, this criterion is the law, and all else is
commentary." (Emphasis in original) U.S. Mission to the United Nations, USNN 49-85,
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There is, of course, the important question here as to
whether or not New Afrikans constitute a "people" and a na-
tion within the contemplation of the self-determination provi-
sions of the international law and/or standards of domestic law
binding, arguably, upon the United States.
Our right to international law rights, I argue, was in fact
established by the United States Supreme Court nearly 150
years before Ambassador Feldman embraced the self-determina-
tion principle in the Declaration on the Principle of Interna-
tional Law. This was done by the court's ruling in the Amistad
case.
72
In 1825, 36 years after the present United States Constitu-
tion had gone into effect and 18 years after that Constitution
had banned the slave trade, Chief Justice John Marshall, while
expressing abhorrence for the trade, refused to acknowledge, for
Afrikans brought before him after being taken in the trade, any
right to self-determination.73 Justice Marshall reasoned that
while Great Britain and the United States had abandoned the
horrid trade and were inveighing upon other states to do so, all
other countries had not yet done so. Thus, he wrote: "the legal-
ity of the capture of a vessel engaged in the slave trade, depends
on the law of the country to which the vessel belongs. If that law
gives its sanction to the trade, restitution will be decreed; if that
law prohibits it, the vessel and cargo will be condemned as good
prize.
'74
But 16 years later the United States Supreme Court, faced
again with a group of Afrikans who had reached these shores
after having been taken in the illegal slave trade, was able to
Press Release, "Statement by Ambassador Harvey J. Feldman . 21 May 1985. New
York: 199 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 20017.
72. United States v. Libellants and Claimants of the Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. (15
Pet.) 332 (1841).
73. The Antelope, Vice-Consuls of Spain and Portugal, 23 U S. (10 Wheat.) 268
(1825) A Privateer ship under Venezuelan commission with an American crew, captured
three ships off the coast of Afrika. The ships were from the United States, Spain, and
Portugal and carried some Africans. The privateers, and their prisoners, were found off
the coast of Georgia and brought into port for adjudication by a revenue cutter. The
issues of the case were which Afrikans were from which ship, and who belonged where.
(Sixteen were determined to be from the American ship.) Spain and Portugal demanded
the Afrikans as slaves who had, in the regular course of business, been acquired as prop-
erty, while United States law said they were men. Id.
74. Id. at 281.
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find in them their individual right to self-determination. In The
Amistad, the Afrikans had successfully revolted on shipboard_
and were in command of the vessel when they and it were seized
by a small United States naval force off Long Island, New
York. United States Navy Lieutenant Gedney sued for salvage.
Spain and the private owners asked return of the ship and the
Afrikans, as slaves. The United States asked that the Afrikans
be turned over to the President for return to the coast of Afrika
in accordance with the act of March 3, 1819, mandating such
treatment for persons freed by the United States in the illegal
slave trade.76
Justice Story, delivering the opinion of the Court, wrote:
It is also a most important consideration in the present
case, which ought not to be lost sight of, that, supposing
these African negroes not to be slaves, but kidnapped,
and free negroes, the treaty with Spain cannot be obliga-
tory upon them; and the United States are bound to re-
spect their rights as much as those of Spanish subjects.
The conflict of rights between the parties under the cir-
cumstances, becomes positive and inevitable, and must
be decided upon the eternal principles of justice and in-
ternational law.7
Justice Story further emphasized the right of these Afrikans
to the impartial application of the international law in United
States courts and to their right to self-determination, as he, in
concluding the opinion, noted that the United States no longer
insisted upon the Afrikans being delivered to the United States
President. He wrote:
[T]here is no ground to assert that the case comes within
the purview of the act of 1819, or of any other of our
prohibitory slave trade acts. These negroes were never
taken from Africa, or brought to the United States in
contravention of those acts. When the Amistad arrived
she was in possession of the negroes, asserting their free-
dom; and in no sense could they possibly intend to im-
75. The Amistad, 40 U.S. at 335-338.
76. Id. at 338-339.
77. Id. at 384.
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port themselves here, as slaves, or for sale as slaves. In
this view of the matter, that part of the decree of the
District Court is unmaintainable, and must be
reversed ...
Upon the whole, our opinion is, that the decree of
the Circuit Court, affirming that of the District Court
ought to be affirmed, except so far as it directs the ne-
groes to be delivered to the President, to be transported
to Africa, in pursuance of the act of the 3rd of March,
1819; and, as to this, it ought to be reversed; and that the
said negroes be declared to be free, and be dismissed
from the custody of the Court, and go without day."8
This development in the law did not, of course, extend the
right of self-determination to the two-and-a-half million New
Afrikans held as slaves; they were still deemed property.
What it did do was to establish the precedent that when
kidnapped and enslaved Afrikans are no longer held as slaves,
they stand before the courts of the United States entitled to the
free exercise of choice-self-determined choice-as to their fu-
ture. It follows that when the thirteenth amendment ended slav-
ery-without offering the formerly enslaved New Afrikan
United States citizenship-the New Afrikan, and all of them,
were in the same position as the Amistad Afrikans: not slaves
"but kidnapped and free" New Afrikans. They were entitled
then-and We are entitled now, as their heirs to a right never
used-to exercise political self-determnation.
If it were otherwise-if, in short, the United States could
impose United States citizenship upon the freed people-then
their freedom did not exist. For the touchstone of slavery was
that the slavemaster could make the most fundamental deci-
sions, including political ones, for the person held as a slave and
without that person's free and self-determined consent.
It is certain, almost, that the 1883 Supreme Court which
proved so hostile to the rights of the freed New Afrikan in-
tended no blanket endorsement of self-determination for New
Afrikans. (That Court might not have objected to our right to
return to Afrika.) However, it correctly interpreted the sweep of




force and effect it abolished slavery, and established universal
freedom" and that the thirteenth amendment "has a reflex char-
acter also, establishing and decreeing universal civil and political
freedom throughout the United States."1 71
I am not aware that the United States Supreme Court or
any federal circuit court of appeals has adopted this argument as
the law. It is a case for us yet to make. Afrikans, descendants of
persons held in the United States as slaves, have no valid United
States citizenship because few of us have exercised the right to
self-determination on the basis of full information and without
duress of any kind: the free exercise of self-determination re-
quires that the individual know, first, that he or she possesses
the right to self-determination and is entitled to say "no" as well
as "yes" to the fourteenth amendment's offer of United States
citizenship. Strategically, this situation offers our people a new
vantage point from which to seek and negotiate for whatever are
our political (and economic) objectives. This includes our repa-
ration rights.
To sum up, I have argued here that the United States has
waged war against us, as individuals and as a nation. (I have
deferred the question of whether We are a nation under interna-
tional law.) My central and underlying point is that our repara-
tions, based upon slavery claims, are best presented in the con-
text of the United States having waged war against us and in the
context of the United States having denied us the exercise of our
right to self-determination.
This is because the most fruitful precedents for our repara-
tion claims are those which have arisen out of the reparations
payments and the self-determination arrangments made in set-
tlement of World War I and World War II. It is also because the
fact is that the United States did wage a most heinous war
against us.
Permit me to offer this final comment on self-determination
and the vitality of the right. A seminar on legal aspects of the
struggle against apartheid was held, under the auspices of the
United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid and of the
Government of Nigeria, from August 13 to 16, 1984, at Lagos."0
79. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
80. See UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE AGAINST APARTHEID, REPORT OF THE
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It drew "together jurists and social scientists from a number of
countries in Africa, Europe, North America and Asia, represent-
ing the principal legal systems of the world." Included was the
secretary-general of the International Commission of Jurists. In
its concluding, formal Declaration,81 the Seminar stated:
The right to self-determination has emerged as part
of jus cogens, overriding principles or imperative norms
of international law which cannot be set aside by treaty
or acquiescence, but only by the formulation of a subse-
quent norm of the same States to the contrary.2
III. NEW AFRIKANS As A NATION AND THE REPARATIONS
PRECEDENTS
It may be possible to devise a strategy designed to win repa-
rations, for slavery-rooted claims, based on damage to the indi-
vidual, without reference to any group. The Versailles Treaty's
assessment of reparations against Germany, at the end of World
War I, provides for "[d]amage[s] to injured persons and to sur-
viving dependents by personal injury to or death of civilians
caused by acts of war" and damages for several other types of
injuries to civilians.8 " But these damages for reparation were
paid to governments through the "Reparation Commission" set
up by the governments.
8'
The series of World War II treatise and agreements, dealing
with reparations, provide for payments "for the rehabilitation
and resettlement of non-repatriable victims of German action,1
8 5
SEMINAR ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE APARTHEID REGIME IN SOUTH AFRICA AND OTHER
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID (Sept. 27, 1984).
81. Id. at 11.
82. Id. at 13.
83. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 65, Part VIII, §I, art. 244, Annex I, paras. 1-3,7,8.
The Treaty of Versailles was never ratified by the United States. See S. Doc. No. 49,
66th Cong., 1st Session (1919), S. Doc. No. 51, 66th Cong., 1st Session (1920).
84. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 65, Part VIII, §1, art. 244, Annex II, para. 12. The
Treaty of Versailles established the Reparation Commission to determine the amount of
damages to be paid by Germany for its participation in World War I. The Commission
was to calculate the actual amount of damages and then organize a schedule of pay-
ments. Id. It was given broad powers including the authority to receive and distribute
monies, as well as "wide latitude as to its control and handling of the whole reparation
problem." Id.
85. Reparation from Germany, Establishment of Inter-Allied Reparation Agency, and
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but these also flowed through a governmental agency, the Inter-
Governmental Committee on Refugees, and by terms of the 1946
agreement by the five powers "should be used not for the com-
pensation of individual victims but for the rehabilitation and re-
settlement of persons in eligible classes."86 The strongest prece-
dent for individual reparations is the program carried out by the
Federal Republic of Germany after World War II. Boris Bittker,
in his The Case for Black Reparations, 87 analyzes the result of
the German reparations laws. Payments did go directly to indi-
viduals (as well as payments made by West Germany to the new
state of Israel) for loss of life, impairment of health, deprivation
of liberty-including "wearing the Star of David every-
where" 8-and property and profession. Writing in 1972, Profes-
sor Bittker calculates that "a total of 1,949,470 claims were adju-
dicated on their merits; 584,703 by German and 1,364,767 by
foreign residents." 89 (Presumably most of the foreign residents
were Jews who re-settled in Israel.)
Reparations by the United States for the indigenous people
here under the Indian Claims Commission Act,90 were not pro-
vided to individuals but to
any Indian tribe, band, or other identifiable group of
American Indians residing within the territorial limits of
the United States or Alaska . . . [for] claims in law or
equity ... [or] sounding in tort ... [revision of] treaties
[and] contracts . . . on the ground of fraud, duress, un-
conscionable consideration, mutual or unilateral mistake
... [and] claims arising from the taking.., of lands...
without ... [agreed] payment. . . and [for] claims based
Restitution of Monetary Gold, Jan. 14, 1946, Part I. Art. 8, 61 Stat. 3157, T.I.A.S. 1655,
555 U.N.T.S. 69.
86. Reparation to Nonrepatriable Victims of German Action, June 14, 1946, 61 Stat.
2649, T.I.A.S. No. 1594. For the purpose of this plan, "eligible classes" means "true vic-
tims of Nazi persecution and ... their immediate families and dependents." Id. The five
powers to sign the agreement were the United States, France, Great Britain, Czechoslo-
vakia, Yugoslavia. Id.
87. B. BITFKER, supra note 1.
88. Id. at 180.
89. Id. at 182.
90. 25 U.S.C.A. § 70 - 70n-2 (omitted Sept. 30, 1978); § 70n-3 (repealed Jan. 2, 1975,
88 stat. 1970, Pub. L. 93-608 § 1(16)); § 70n-4 - 70v-3 (omitted Sept. 30, 1978); § 70w
(repealed May 24, 1949, c. 139, § 142, 62 stat. 109) (1946).
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upon fair and honorable dealings that are not recognized
by any existing rule of law or equity.'
However, a United States political subdivision, the City of
Los Angeles, has paid direct reparatiofis. This was in 1984 to 36
Japanese former city employees who, at the beginning of World
War II, had been fired from their jobs and interned, despite be-
ing "loyal Americans." The City Council apologized in a resolu-
tion and gave each $5,000 as a token reparation. 2 Similarly, the
City of San Francisco in January 1983 paid $1,250 per year of
internment, to former Japanese employees of the city.93
Finally, Professor Y.N. Kly in his thoughtful book, Inter-
national Law and the Black Minority in the United States,94
suggests the New Afrikans should view self-determination as a
last resort and identify ourself as a "national minority," within
the contemplation of the international law, and seek from the
United States the "special measures" which the international
law requires. Dr. Kly suggests that these "special measures"
would "make available the circumstances, finances, technology,
etc. required to enable the minority to reach equality with the
majority, maintain its cultural and ethnic identity, if desired,
while sharing a political, economic and social equal-status rela-
tionship with the majority."95 Presumably some of the "fi-
nances" of a special measures program could go directly to indi-
viduals, although when Dr. Kly chronicles special measures
programs in a number of states (e.g., the Swedish program for
the Lapps), the finances, where this is a part of the program, go
91. 25 U.S.C.A. §70a (omitted 1978); Act, August 13, 1946, c. 959, §2, 60 Stat. 1049,
1050.
92. Henricus, Japanese-American Bitter But Accepts L.A.'s Apology, Philadelphia
Inquirer, Sept. 13, 1984, at B3.
93. Around The Nation: Some WW II Internees Getting $$ in 'Frisco, Wash. Post,
Jan. 25, 1983, at A6. Subsequent to the delivery of this paper at the NCBL Conference,
the United States House of Representatives on 17 September 1987, approved a repara-
tions bill for the estimated 60,000 still-living Japanese who were interned in the United
States during World War II. The bill exceeds 2.5 billion dollars, and includes direct pay-
ments of $20,000 to each eligible person and a trust fund for education and related pur-
poses. Kenworthy, House Votes Apology, Reparations for Japanese Americans Held
During War, Wash. Post, Sept. 18, 1987, at A3.
94. Y.N. KLY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE BLACK MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES
(1985).




Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights,9 7 identifies three kinds of "minorities"- ethnic, reli-
gious, and linguistic. Dr. Kly believes that since an "ethnic mi-
nority" is based not simply on race but on group tradition, or
culture, New Afrikans, Puerto Ricans, and Indians could fold
themselves within this definition.
9 8
Whatever the value of this strategy, advocates of achieving
reparations as individuals, without reference to group relation-
ship, are apt to find no special encouragement.
It is clear, moreover, that the Indian states "in the United
States" have been treated (and view themselves) as states and
nations, not national minorities. In fact, the designation placed
upon Indian political units by Justice John Marshall in
1831-"domestic dependent nations "-remains a part of the law
today.9 Puerto Ricans who have voluntarily come to the United
States (it is voluntary only if the effects of colonization are dis-
counted) could be viewed, by those who regard the United
States's imposition of citizenship upon the Puerto Ricans as in-
valid, as a national minority since they are living in another
country but have a country of their own. The basic point is that
they do have a country of their own. From the standpoint of
Puerto Rican nationalists, their country-their state-is colo-
nized by the United States, and Puerto Ricans are in a national
liberation struggle.
In appraising the situation of New Afrikans in the United
States it is important to keep in mind that We have, almost
from the beginning, followed simultaneously three-not
one-strategies of struggle. This is to say that simultaneously
some of us have followed each of the strategies. Those strategies
96. Id. at 23-31.
97. UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE AGAINST APARTHEID, supra note 77, at 15.
98. KLY, supra note 94, at 27-28.
99. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 9 U.S. (5 Pet.) 178, 181 (1831); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (After defendant was convicted by a Navajo court, he was
subsequently indicted by a Federal Grand Jury for a crime arising out of the same inci-
dent. The Court rejected defendant's claim of double jeopardy since the Navajo have the
power to punish offenders of certain of their laws by Navajo citizens by virtue of the
Navajo own residual sovereignty.); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (The Court
found that the state court lacked jurisdiction since Indian courts have authority over
Reservation affairs and state interference with such power would undermine the rights of
the Indians to govern themselves as expressed in the 1868 treaty with the Navajos.).
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have been, first, to return to Africa (Paul Cuffee through Garvey
to the Hebrew Israelites); °° second, to change the United States
and join it as full citizens (Richard Allen through Frederick
Douglass to Martin Luther King);' °' and, third, to build an inde-
pendent state on land claimed in North America by the United
States (Gabriel Prosser through Tunis Campbell to Malcolm X
and the Provisional Government-RNA).' °2 Throughout our three
hundred years of struggle on this soil, We have, from at least
1660, been evolving into and have become a Black Nation, a
New Afrikan nation, even with the simultaneous pursuit of three
strategies.
The prolific Floyd J. Miller in his important book, The
Search for a Black Nationality,0 3 found and stated: "A further
indication of the depth of this alienation is the fact that at one
time or another, almost all black leaders regardless of the nature
of their reaction to emigration were compelled to acknowledge
what both Delaney and Douglass independently announced in
the 1850s-that blacks in the United States were a 'a nation
within a nation.' ,,104
For clarity on the difference between "nation" and "state,"
it is perhaps helpful to call on Professor Robin Alison Reming-
ton in her discussion of Yugoslavia. She writes:
A country is the piece of real estate occupied by the
state. Neither a country nor a state is a 'nation.' Rather,
a 'nation' is a group of individuals united by common
100. For information on Paul Cuffe, see S. HARRIS, PAUL CUFFE: BLACK AMERICA AND
THE AFRICA RETURN (1972); for information on Marcus Garvey, see E. CRONON, supra
note 45.
101. For information on Richard Allen, see C. GEORGE, SEGREGATED SABBATHS: RICH-
ARD ALLEN AND THE EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT BLACK CHURCHES, 1760-1840 (1973); for
information on Fredrick Douglass, see A. BONTEMPS, FREE AT LAST: THE LIFE OF FRED-
RICK DOUGLASS (1971); for information on Martin Luther King, see OATES, LET THE
TRUMPET SOUND: THE LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (1982).
102. For information on Gabriel Prosser, see P. FONER, supra note 23, at 453-56; for
information on Tunis Campbell, see R. DUNCAN, FREEDOM'S SHORE: TUNIS CAMPBELL AND
THE GEORGIA FREEDMAN (1986); for information on Malcolm X, see L. LOMAX, supra note
45.
103. F. MILLER, THE SEARCH FOR A BLACK NATIONALITY (1975).
104. Id. at 270 (citing M. DELANEY, THE CONDITION, ELEVATION, EMIGRATION, AND
DESTINY OF THE COLORED PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, POLITICALLY CONSIDERED 209
(1852), and Douglass, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN AND FOREIGN SLAV-
ERY SOCIETY 184 (New York, 1853)).
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bonds of historical development, language, religion, and
their self-perceived collective identity. *** According to
the 1971 census, the Yugoslav population is 20.5 million,
including five official 'nations' and a variety of nationali-
ties. The nations are the Serbs, 8.4 million; Croats, 4.8
million; Slovenes, 1.7 million; Macedonians, 1.2 million;
and Montenegrins, 608 thousand.'
Elsewhere, I have made a contribution toward (I hope)
clarity.
People live in states. The United States is a state: all
the fifty states make one United States, and in interna-
tional law the entire United States (with its 50 constitu-
ent states) is known as a state. A state has people, land
and government. The government, acting for the state,
protects the people and the land from outside attack by
means of diplomacy and its army; government controls
conflict among its own people by education and indoctri-
nation and by means of law, courts and the police. The
government, representing the state, has final control over
the lives of people. Only the state, through its govern-
ment, can lawfully jail people or kill people-either by
executing them or sending people to war.But people
come before states. This is to say that nations exist
before states. States are created to protect nations. For, a
nation is the people and their beliefs and their perspec-
tive (their way of looking at themselves and the world)
and their way of life-their social structure and their eco-
nomic structure. These have arisen out of a people's own
special history, over time. States can be created sud-
denly, by declaration, by new constitutions, by military
coups and successful revolution and by treaty. But na-
tions can only be created by time: nations are people
brought together by common history and common mis-
sion and common struggle, cemented by common values
and a common way of life, on a given land mass, over
time. Nations must evolve. They come into being by
105. Remington, Yugoslavia, in COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE 214 (T. Rakowska-
Harmstone and A. Gyorgy, eds. 1981).
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growing over decades. The United States began as a
white nation, a new English nation, which grew up be-
tween 1607 and 1776 in a land away from England. In
England the people were having a different experience
and history than the English in America. In America the
Whites, led by the English, fought Indians and Afrikans
for that in which they, the Whites, believed: they be-
lieved in the superiority of Whites over Indians and
Afrikans and the right of Whites to take all the land and
oppress and exploit Afrikans and Indians.
These Americans, the Whites, built a state, a Repub-
lic, to protect the American nation. They did not build
this state to protect Indians or Afrikans; in fact, it was
built to help Whites better oppress and exploit Indians
and Afrikans. It was built to protect the white nation.
Meanwhile, We, the Afrikans, were forming into a new
nation also, a new Afrikan nation. This happened be-
tween 1660, when the English in America decided defi-
nitely to hold us in slavery, and 1865, when our work and
sacrifice in the Civil War brought an end to slavery. In
those two hundred years We who had come from differ-
ent nations in Afrika, where our states had been weak-
ened or defeated altogether, fused into a new people, a
new Afrikan people. Struggle against the oppression of
the White state in North America, the United States,
fused us. Over the course of 20 decades.10 6
I have already mentioned some of the state-building efforts
undertaken by New Afrikans in North America. What is not
commonly acknowledged is that the work of Richard Allen-Fred-
erick Douglass-Martin King group has also been a form of state-
building. For, these men and women were bent on taking the
American state-structure, rife with anti-Black laws, and chang-
ing it. In other words, they sought to create a state different
from that which its White nationalist founders, and the majority
of its citizens, really envisioned. With respect to the state struc-
ture, it might be added, this strategy has seen some marked suc-
cess. (Discriminatory laws are now gone, but racism remains in
106. IMARI A. OBADELE, A BEGINNER'S OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF AFRIKAN PEOPLE,
19-20 (1st ed. 1987).
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the economic and social structures. Racism also sometimes is op-
erative in the use to which government officials put the state
machinery.)
Finally the Declaration issued by the international law con-
ference at Lagos in 1984 provided "elements of a definition" of
the term "peoples" used in the Decolonization Declaration, the
Declaration on the Principles of International Law, and the In-
ternational Covenants on Human Rights, in the common
phrase, "All peoples have the right of self-determination." Ac-
cording to the 1984 Lagos Declaration: 7
(a) The term "people" denotes a social entity pos-
sessing a clear identity and its own characteristics;
(b) It implies a relationship with a territory, even if
the people in question has been wrongly expelled from it
and artificially replaced by another population.0 8
The Malcolm X Society, anticipating the founding of the
Provisional Government, settled on the five states of Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina as the na-
tional territory of New Afrika, not only because they were con-
tiguous and fed on the south by the Gulf and on the east by the
Atlantic Ocean, but especially because these states (plus Vir-
ginia) had been the heartland of the territory on which We had
developed into a new nation, giving to the land our blood and
our sweat, our love and our hopes, during the course of the 200
years between 1660 and 1865, and thereafter.
So the proposition of this paper and the annexed draft repa-
rations legislation is that the United States waged long, cruel,
and unjust war against us as a nation, and for that there is re-
sponsibility. The World War I and World War II reparations
settlements were imposed upon Germany by victorious armies,
and Konrad Adenaur, leader of West Germany, engineered the
payment of reparations to the Jews'019 as part of the price re-
107. See UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE AGAINST APARTHEID, supra note 80.
108. Id. at 15.
109. The Rich Legacy of "Der Alte", N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1967, §4, at 1, col. 5. Kon-
rad Adenauer was the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949-63. Id.
Fondly rememberedas "Der Alte," the Old Man, Adenauer was responsible for trans-
forming post-World War II Germany into a strong economic and political World power.
Id. Adenauer, a staunch anti-Nazi, ordered financial restitution to be paid by his country
to the Jewish victims of Hitler's persecution. Id. In September, 1952 Adenauer signed a
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quired of him for loosening the new bonds which bound and
humbled the German nation after the war.
Today the New Afrikan nation, still pursuing simultane-
ously its three strategies of struggle, has no victorious armies to
compel compliance, only the international law-and the strength
and ingenuity of the uses to which We and our allies may put
the politics of the American state. Nevertheless, the debt to us
and its grounds were clearly presaged by the language and im-
port of the World War I and World War II agreements; only the
names need changing:
The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and
Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her
allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the
Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals
have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed
upon them by the aggression of Germany and her
allies.110
The Allied and Associated Governments, however, re-
quire, and Germany undertakes, that she will make com-
pensation for all damage done to the civilian population
of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their prop-
erty during the period of the belligerency."'
Compensation may be claimed from Germany under Ar-
ticle 232 above in respect of the total damage under the
following categories:
(2) Damage caused by Germany or her allies to civil-
ian victims of acts of cruelty, violence, or maltreat-
ment (including injuries to life or health ... )
(8) Damage caused to civilians by being forced by
Germany or her allies to labour without just
remuneration." 2
- Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her
to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Repara-
Reparations Agreement with Israel. A. HORNE, RETURN TO POWER , 637 (1956). Negotia-
tion Guidelines for Claims on Israeli Secular Property, Sept. 10, 1952, West Germany-
Israel, 162 U.N.T.S. 91.
110. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 65, Part VIII, § I, art. 231.
111. Id. at art. 232.
112. Id. at art. 244, Annex I.
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tions are to be received in the first instance by those
countries which have borne the main burden of the
war.
118
- In recognition of the fact that large numbers of persons
have suffered heavily at the hands of the Nazis and now
stand in dire need of aid to promote their
rehabilitation."l
4
- In the portion of Upper Silend organizational work in
the New Afrikan communities across the land can put
the issue of reparations-now on the r they wish to be at-
tached to Germany or to Poland." '
- The plebiscite area shall be immediately placed under
the authority of an International Commission ... Section
4. The right to vote shall be given to all persns without
distinction of sex ... The result of the vote will be deter-
mined by communes according to the majority of votes in
each commune.'
In brief, the terms of the attached draft legislation reflect
practices which are not unknown to the United States and other
states which participated in or observed the arrangements which
followed the two world wars. The plan would provide repara-
tions to the state-building Provisional Government and to indi-
viduals and organized, serving, community groups as well.
IV. SOME POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The classic "March on Washington,""' 7 well organized and
preceded and followed by serious informational and organiza-
tional work in the New Afrikan communities across the land can
put the issue of reparations-now on the general public agenda
113. Yalta Conference, Feb. 11, 1945, United States-Great Britain-USSR, Part V,
para. 1.
114. Reparation from Germany, Establishment of Inter-Allied Reparation Agency,
and Restitution of Monetary Gold, Jan. 14, 1946, Part I. Art. 8, 61 Stat. 3157, T.I.A.S.
1655, 555 U.N.T.S. 69.
115. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 65, Part III, §VIII, art. 88.
116. Id. at Annex, para. 2.
117. For information on the 1963 March on Washington, see NATIONAL AFRO-AMERI-
CAN LABOR COUNCIL RECORDS (Parrish ed., 1960-75)(available at the Schomberg Center
for Black Research, 515 Lennox Ave., New York, N.Y.), and M. MAVABLE, BLACK AMERI-
CAN POLITICS (1985).
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and create a mass Black bloc in favor of reparations. Further,
adroit intervention in the United States' presidential election
process, until July 1988, could yield some members of Con-
gress-perhaps all of Congressman Fauntroy's" s 120 New
Afrikan-dependent Representatives-and a United States Presi-
dent generally and provisionally committed to the legislation.
But, neither of these necessary achievements is sufficient to
win passage of a reparations bill. We need a majority of the 435
members of the United States House of Representatives and a
majority of the 100 members of the United States Senate.119
Our problem is the power of lingering racism in the majority
of White people in the United States and in their govermental
representatives. We should acknowledge that today's America is
a different America than 20 years ago: there is considerably less
vindictiveness and hostility among young Blacks and Whites,
given that Black youth harbor varying degrees of resentment at
Whites and their systems of preference.
But traditionally there has been a certain meanness in the
attitude of most Americans towards us. One wit has opined,
"The Americans must really love us, because they've never felt it
necessary to saprovisionally committed to the legislation.
But, neither of these necessary achievements is sufficient
tost war and cultural assault have been-and are-the issue. It
is instructive that when Abraham Lincoln, urged by New
Afrikan leaders to end slavery at least in Washington, D.C., and
the Border States, and motivated by his own complex of reasons
to do so, including the humanitarian one, moved to end this
slavery, he proposed not payment to the Afrikan, for life and
labor stolen, but payment to the slaveholders! 20 Payments were
made. 121
118. Congressman Walter Edward Fauntroy, Democrat of the District of Columbia;
elected to office in 1971, and reelected in each subsequent election.
119. A very remote possibility is reparations by treaty, requiring the signature of the
United States President and consent of two-thirds of the United States Senate.
120. Lincoln, First Annual Message, in A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS, 3337-3341 (J. Richardson ed. 1897).
121. The act to end slavery in District of Columbia provided payments to slavehold-
ers. 54 Stat. 376-77 (1862). Professor Kenneth Goings, Chairman of the Department of
History at the College of Wooster, states that payments were actually made to slavehold-
ers and that under the colonization provisions of the Act (Section II) a number of New
Afrikans did go to Liberia and settle.
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To the great credit of the Americans, however, in the blush
of the chastening circumstances of a terrible, four-year Civil
War, the United States House of Representatives and the Sen-
ate did muster a majority in each house and passed a bill, on the
Freedman's Bureau, which did provide for us the hallowed forty
acres. (The houses could not, however, muster the two-thirds
majorities in each house needed to override Andrew Johnson's
veto, and so the bill did not pass and we did not get the 40
acres.) 2'
Yet despite this and certain other important instances of
the triumph of principle, there has also been a persistent
counter-trend in the historic relations of White and Black in
America, as Derrick Bell has put it in his essay, "The Racial
Imperative in American Law."'I2 That trend has been the recur-
rent sacrifice of justice for New Afrikans to the expedient inter-
ests of Whites, even where cost-benefit analysis did not clearly
favor those interests. In a related and specific manner, despite
the presence of precedents in the Indian and world war repara-
tions settlements, the attitude of the White Community, the
Americans, seems to be that freeing us from slavery was enough:
We were lucky to be brought here and lucky to be freed! These
attitudes are obstacles.
I am convinced, however, that collective genius can devise
the strategy to win the needed majority in Congress. As a
teacher of young people, I am also convinced that a part of that
strategy must be to alter the textbooks and our conventions in
teaching the American experience-and to alter kindred conven-
tions in movies and literature-so that Americans and New
Afrikans, living now, may come to a deep appreciation of both
(1) the nature of the war waged against us and Indians in
America, and of the military occupation We have suffered here,
and (2) the war in which struggle in America changed the
White-supremacist United States state structure, in two great
leaps (i.e., the Civil War and the Black Revolution of the 1960s),
into a state structure free of anti-Black laws and enhanced, in-
stead, by the comely filigree We call affirmative action.
I am convinced it can be achieved.
122. W.E.B. DuBois, supra note 15, at 273-77.
123. Derrick Bell, The Racial Imperative in American Law, in THE AGE OF SEGREGA-
TION: RACE RELATIONS IN THE SOUTH, 1890-1940 (R. Haws ed. 1978).
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ANNEX
A Proposed Act, Rather Than A Constitutional Amendment,
For Reparations**
AN ACT TO STIMULATE ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE
UNITED STATES AND COMPENSATE, IN PART, FOR
THE GRIEVOUS WRONGS OF SLAVERY AND THE
UNJUST ENRICHMENT WHICH ACCRUED TO THE
UNITED STATES THEREFROM
Preamble
WHEREAS the Congress of the United States has never ac-
corded ultimate political justice to New Afikans in this country -
New Afrikans being all the descendants of Afrikans held as
slaves in this country - by authorizing a plebiscite and a process
of registration whereby collectively and individually New
Afrikans could exercise their right to self-determination by
freely and with full information voting collectively on their po-
litical future, and registering individual political options, and
WHEREAS the Congress of the United States recognizes
the Thirteenth Amendment as protecting this right of New
Afrikan people to self-determination, and
WHEREAS the illegal transportation to, and the enslave-
ment of Afrikan people in the United States was carried out
under authority of the U.S. Constitution for seventy-seven years,
and for 167 years under the antecedent authority of the Articles
of Confederation, the Continental Congress's resolutions, and
the Colonial law, and
WHEREAS the authority in the United States Constitution
for enslavement of the New Afrikan people was contained in
clause three, Section Two of the Fourth Article, commonly
known as the fugitive slave provision, which placed the full force
of the United States military, executives, and courts against
even the most inoffensive person held as a slave who quietly
slipped away to freedom, and against the entire New Afrikan
people, and
** Submitted by: Dr. Imari Abubakari Obadele, President, Republic of New Afrika,
Assistant Professor, The College of Wooster and Attorney Chokwe Lumumba, Chairper-
son, The New Afrikan People's Organization.
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WHEREAS the United States further dehumanized the
New Afrikan by holding her/him to have the status of three-
fifths of a white person in clause three, Section Two of Article
One of the United States Constitution, and
WHEREAS that most heinous war against Afrika, com-
monly known as the slave trade, was authorized for United
States principals for 20 years more after the ratification of the
United States' Constitution by clause one in Section Nine of the
First Article of the United States Constitution, and
WHEREAS principles of international law and a reconcilia-
tion of the peoples require that the United States attempt a
good faith, if partial, reparation for the unjust war waged against
the New Afrikan people for 200 years, and for cultural destruc-
tion, and for labor stolen, and
WHEREAS the concept of reparations is recognized in
United States law, and the United States has sponsored and
paid reparations for other victims, and
WHEREAS the Congress finds that New Afrikan people,
descendants of persons kidnapped from Afrika and held here
against their will, currently residing in the United States, are
entitled to exercise collective and individual rights to self-deter-
mination, and
WHEREAS the Congress is aware that the options regard-
ing political future which are open to the New Afrikans include
(a) return to Afrika, (b) departure for some country other than
one in Afrika, (c) acceptance of U.S. citizenship, and (d) creation
of an independent New Afrikan state in North America, and
WHEREAS the Congress is convinced that some New
Afrikan people will choose each of these four options, and
WHEREAS, moreover, the Congress is further convinced
that some New Afrikan people will never forsake the three-cen-
turies-old desire to create an independent New Afrikan state in
North America and have, in fact, duly elected a Provisional Gov-
ernment to protect the interests of the New Afrikan nation, as a
nation, and to establish an independent New Afrikan state by
means sanctioned by international law, and
WHEREAS the Congress finds that various international
covenants and resolutions affirming that all peoples have the
right to self-determination apply to Afrikan people born in
North America, and
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WHEREAS the Congress recognizes that the necessary
foundation for effectuating the results of an act of self-determi-
nation by the New Afrikan people is the means and resources to
achieve those results, and
WHEREAS the authority for providing such means and re-
sources lies in Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment, and
WHEREAS this legislation affects only those parties under
domestic United States jurisdiction and is not to be construed as
discharging the obligation owed to Afrikan people by other
countries and governments,
THEREFORE the following provisions are enacted into law
under the authority of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
TITLE I. Reparations
1. The United States accepts the obligation of the United
States to pay reparations to the descendants of Afrikans held as
slaves in the United States and undertakes to make such pay-
ments to the New Afrikan nation as a political unit, to compen-
sate in part for the destruction and/or damage to Afrikan politi-
cal units in Afrika and for the abortion and destruction of New
Afrikan political units in the United States during the era of
slavery, and payments to New Afrikan organizations to compen-
sate in part for the deliberate subversion of the New Afrikan
social structure, and the obligation to pay directly to each New
Afrikan, descendant of Afrikans held as slaves in the United
States and born on or before the date of ratification of this Act,
and still living on the date of each appropriation, the total sum
of -.
2. Congress is authorized to appropriate and pay annually
sums of money and credit to discharge this obligation over a pe-
riod of years, between thirteen billion and thirty-two billion dol-
lars annually.
a. One-third of the annual sum shall go directly to each
individual, except that the sum due a person not yet 17 years of
age who is not head of an independent household shall be paid
to the head-of-household who stands as such person's parent or
guardian or jointly to such persons in the case of husband and
wife. Social Security records, Internal Revenue records, and Aid-
to-Dependent-Children records, or records of successor agencies,
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shall be available to facilitate determination of heads-of-house-
hold, as consistently as possible with the provisions of the Pri-
vacy Act, its conflicting provisions hereby being waived. This
program shall be administered by the Internal Revenue Service.
b. One-third of the annual sum shall go directly to the
duly elected government of the Republic of New Afrika, and to
any other state-building entity of New Afrikan people, provided
that elections for the RNA Provisional Government or for the
officers of such other New Afrikan state-holding entity are ob-
served by the United Nations or other distinguished interna-
tional body and deemed by said international body to be open,
honest, and democratic, for purposes of the economic, social,
cultural, and educational development of the New Afrikan na-
tion-state or states. This payment shall be made by the United
State Treasury.
c. One-third of the annual sum shall be paid directly to a
National Congress of Organizations, consisting of all the New
Afrikan churches and other New Afrikan organizations which for
a period of two years prior to enactment of this legislation have
engaged in community programs designed to end the scourge of
drugs and crime in New Afrikan communities and advance the
social, economic, educational, or cultural progress and enrich-
ment of New Afrikan people. Programs serving New Afrikan
communities shall be eligible to participate in local conventions
of the National Congress of Organizations, provided that these
programs are led by New Afrikans and have been so led for at
least three years prior to enactment of this legislation. The
United States Treasury shall administer this payment.
TITLE II. Plebiscites & Self-Determination
1. Pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment, the United
States President is authorized and directed to arrange with the
President or appropriate body of the Provisional Government of
the Republic of New Afrika and/or other state-building entities
the holding, within five years after the enactment of this legisla-
tion, of independence plebiscites in all such counties, or major
portions of such counties, in the states of South Carolina, Geor-
gia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and
Tennessee, where ten percent of Afrikans, aged 16 or over,
within such counties or major portions thereof signify their de-
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sire for the holding of such plebiscites.
2. Such ten-percent petitions may be certified by special
Status Courts, hereby created in the same districts as the now-
established districts for United States courts, within the states
enumerated in Paragraph One of this Title, and Regional Status
Courts are hereby created in New York, Chicago, Atlanta, and
Los Angeles. The judges of each of these Article One-Thirteenth
Amendment Status Courts shall be three in number: one ap-
pointed by the President of the United States, one appointed by
the Republic of New Afrika, and one which the General Assem-
bly of the United Nations shall be invited to appoint.
3. The jurisdiction of said Status Courts shall be limited to
(1) determination of the validity of petitions for plebiscites and
their certification, (2) the certification of Election results, and
(3) such other matters as are set out in this Act. Such Status
Courts, established under Article One and the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and
the agreement of the Provisional Government of the Republic of
New Afrika, insofar as the authority of the United States is con-
cerned, shall have power to compel the appearance and testi-
mony of witnesses, issue process for production of evidence,
make findings of fact and conclusions of law, conduct trials, and
issue judgments.
4. Such Status Courts shall have power through a confer-
ence, presided over by a Chief Judge elected by the Conference
of all Status Court judges, to issue rules, consistent with the
rules of the federal courts of the United States, the Judicial
Statute or the Republic of New Afrika, and the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. Such rules shall become effective
if not returned for further consideration by the United States of
the Republic of New Afrika sixty days after the date of promul-
gation by the Chief Judge of the Status Courts. In the event of
such return, the Chief Judge may amend the Rules and promul-
gate them de novo, under the same conditions of veto. Judges of
the Status Courts shall have power to conduct contempt pro-
ceedings and assess penalties upon findings of contempt, which
penalties shall not exceed five years in prison and a $10,000 fine.
5. Compensation for Status Court judges shall be the same
as that of District Judges of the United States. The United
States shall promptly and regularly pay these salaries and pro-
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vide for adequate staffing and support services for the Status
Courts. Such compensation and expenses shall be included in
the regular budgeting and appropriations for the United States
Courts and shall not be treated as a charge against the appropri-
ation for reparations.
6. Change of Sovereignty. Whenever a simple majority of
voters in a county or a portion of a county pre-designated for
plebiscite, shall during a plebiscite on status vote in favor of a
government of the Republic of New Afrika, or in favor of a ma-
jority of Republic of New Afrikan candidates for the legislative
or governing body of such county, or portion thereof, that area
shall be deemed to be under the sovereignty of the Republic of
New Afrika. The provisions of this Section, paragraphs 6, 7, and
8 apply not only to the RNA Provisional Government but to any
New Afrikan state-building entity filing ten-percent petitions in
accordance with paragraphs 1 through 5 of Title II of this Act.
7. The United States shall undertake to secure agreement
from the Republic of New Afrika that all persons residing in an
area where the Republic of New Afrika wins sovereignty shall be
guaranteed all the rights set forth in the United Nations Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, to the same extent that the
United States guarantees these rights to all persons residing in
the United States.
8. Immediately after the first plebiscite which results in a
confirmation of Republic of New Afrika sovereignty, the Presi-
dent of the United States shall invite the President of the Re-
public of New Afrika and the Secretary General of the United
Nations to join in a request to the Status Courts that they open
official Status Registers. These Registers shall permit individual
New Afrikans who, living in the United States, do not wish to
accept United States citizenship, and New Afrikans who, living
in New Afrika, do not wish to retain New Afrikan citizenship, to
register these personal options. A New Afrikan who does not
register a personal option shall be deemed to have the citizen-
ship of the sovereignty-New Afrikan or United States -under
which he or she lives, but this fact for New Afrikans who remain
in the United States does not obliterate New Afrikan citizenship
in the context of dual citizenship. Such registration of personal
choice must take place within three years of a status plebiscite
in the area in which a person resides, where a change of sover-
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eignty occurs. In all cases New Afrikans wishing to exercise a
personal option for citizenship in the Republic of New Afrika
but living in an area where no plebiscite has been held or where
no Status Court is established, must do so within ten years after
the date of the enactment of this legislation. For this purpose
the United States Postal Service shall provide secure Status
Letters which, after execution, shall be delivered to the appro-
priate Regional Status Court in New York, Chicago, Atlanta, or
Los Angeles. Persons may file personally at these Regional Sta-
tus Courts. The citizenship of a child, 15 years old or younger,
shall be the same as that of his or her parents, parent, or guard-
ian who stands as head-of-household, unless such person main-
tains an independent household.
TITLE III. Freedom For Black Liberation Army Soldiers
1. The Congress of the United States finds that the contin-
ued imprisonment of the following Black Libertion Army
soldiers and certain other persons is contrary to the national in-
terests of the United States and a substantial impediment to the
successful fulfillment of the intent of this legislation under the
Thirteenth Amendment, that intent being to stimulate economic
growth in the United States, compensate in part victims and
heirs for past wrongs, facilitate racial healing and reconciliation
in the United States, and provide for the long delayed exercise
of the right to self-determination by the New Afrikan people.
The Congress finds that the continued imprisonment of these
persons is contrary to fulfillment of the United States's obliga-
tions under the Thirteenth Amendment. The Congress therefore
directs the immediate release of these persons from prison with-
out condition:
Sundiata Acoli
Assata Shakur (who is in exile in Cuba)
Herman Bell
Albert Nuh Washington
Jalil Muntuaqin (a.k.a. Anthony Bottom)
(LIST TO BE COMPLETED)
2. The United States Congress, for its part, further provides
to the Status Courts, hereinabove established, jurisdiction to ac-
cept applications from persons similarly situated and the power
to make prompt and just decisions on their applications for
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release.
TITLE IV. Administrative Funds
Funds for the administration of' the provisions of this Act
shall be appropriated from the general treasury of the United
States and included in the budgets of the Status Courts and the
executive agencies responsible for carrying out the provisions of
this legislation, without any charges against the sums appropri-
ated for the payment of reparations under Title I of this Act.

